Forecasts from the representative bank model differ dramatically from those produced by bankspecific models and actual outcomes. The results highlight the policy uncertainty inherent in using stress tests, both to set minimum bank capital requirements and to assess the capital adequacy needed to maintain banking system stability. 
I. Introduction
Beginning in 2009 with the Federal Reserve's Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), the Federal Reserve began using dynamic stress tests to assess the capital adequacy of the largest US financial institutions and gauge the overall stability of the US banking system.
Dynamic stress tests use econometric models to forecast a financial institution's income and regulatory capital over one or more hypothetical multi-year economic stress scenarios.
Institutions project their performance under economic conditions specified by regulators and evaluate whether their capital is adequate to absorb losses created by the hypothetical adverse economic conditions. Regulators evaluate banks' own stress test estimates by comparing each institution's forecast to projections from a confidential supervisory stress test model. The supervisory stress test model is a representative bank model, a model that is calibrated to mimic the behavior of an average bank. Regulatory stress tests are not only used to set institution-specific minimum capital requirements, but to assess the overall capital adequacy and resilience of the banking system. 4 The use of a representative bank stress test model as the benchmark of comparison raises some important issues. An explicit goal of mandatory stress testing requirements is to foster the development of individual institutions' risk management capabilities. Given this goal, it is appropriate for institutions to build their own internal stress test models using their own historical. If participating banks are unique in some dimension(s), it is unclear how closely a representative bank model may track individual bank stress test forecasts. The stress test forecasts and minimum regulatory capital projections from a representative bank model may differ markedly from the projections made by a bank's own internal stress test model. If the divergence is large and widespread across institutions, it may not only create legitimate disagreements regarding the adequate level of minimum capital needed at individual institutions, it may also give authorities misleading signals about the overall resilience of the banking system.
In this paper, I investigate the coherence of a regulatory process that evaluates capital adequacy and financial stability using a representative bank stress test model to assess the stress test forecasts and capital adequacy projections made by individual banks. The experimental design uses the first 12 quarters of the 2008 financial crisis to seed the macroeconomic and financial market data that characterize the stress scenario. I compare alternative stress test model projections to the actual performance of 14 large US banks over 12 stress scenario quarters. 4 In a recent speech ( https://www.bis.org/review/r190207a.htm ), Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Quarles said that stress tests offer the Federal Reserve "a forward-looking measurement of bank capital, a view of common and systemic risks across the banking sector, and a broader understanding of the health of the financial system." Moreover, for nearly 20 years, the International Monetary Fund has included bank stress tests as a key component in its member financial stability assessments. See, for example Ong (2014).
I assume the regulatory authority estimates a representative bank stress test model using an approach that closely mimics the process used to estimate the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York's CLASS model (Hirtle, et. al., 2015) . The CLASS model was used to estimate bank performance in the Federal Reserve 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (Bhanot, Hirtle, Kovner, and Vickery, 2014) . I assume banks use their own historical data and estimate bank-specific stress test models following an identical CLASS-style algorithm.
I develop a method to remove the impact of any dividends, share repurchases, asset sales or capital injections on bank capital ratios, including any capital injections associated with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) that may have occurred over the stress test scenario. The analysis also must account for a significant number of bank mergers that take place during the stress test period. I develop new procedures to merger-adjust stress test forecasts so that ex ante forecasts can be made more comparable to individual banks' reported outcomes.
I estimate a baseline time path for individual bank equity-asset ratios under passive management operating assumptions. 5 The implied time path for individual bank equity-asset ratios are compared to forecasts from each bank's individual CLASS-style stress test model as well as to forecasts from the representative bank stress test model. The results highlight the magnitude of the policy uncertainty associated with the use of stress tests, both to set institutionspecific minimum capital requirements and to assess the capital adequacy and resilience of the entire banking system.
In order to "pass" the stress test, I assume that institutions are required to sustain, without any capital injections or asset sales, equity-asset ratios of at least 6 percent in every stress test 5 No dividend payments, no share buybacks, no new external capital, no asset sales, and no changes in loan exposure or other operating characteristics.
quarter. 6 Historically, after removing the impact of capital injections, asset sales, dividends and share repurchases, 2 of the 14 institutions I examine fail to pass the stress test. For these institutions, a minor amount of additional equity capital ($151 million) is required to mitigate the capital shortfall at both institutions.
When the stress test is run using the representative bank model, 6 of 14 institutions are projected to fail dramatically. The forecast from the representative bank stress test model indicates that these 6 banks need, in aggregate, $925 billion in additional equity capital to pass the stress test. In contrast, when individual institution-specific CLASS-style models are used to forecast each banks' performance, two banks fail. In the latter case, the aggregate estimated equity capital shortfall is $29 billion.
The stress test models I analyze use identical macroeconomic and financial market data and identical estimation algorithms. The only thing that differs between models are the bankspecific explanatory variables used to estimate the stress test models. All model coefficient estimates are selected to provide the highest adjusted R 2 for the estimation data set utilized.
Because the estimation data sets used by the individual banks and the regulator differ (and appropriately so), there is no statistical way to determine ex ante which of the stress test estimates is likely to be more accurate. The magnitude of the difference between the alternative stress test model estimates is a gauge for the magnitude of policy uncertainty associated with stress test based bank regulation.
The findings suggest that when stress tests are used to judge the capital adequacy of the largest US banks, in reality, the outcome of the exercise mostly depends on the expert judgement of regulatory authorities. Forecasts from the alternative stress test models indicate that these 14 large banks require, in aggregate, somewhere between $29 billion and $925 billion in new equity capital to ensure their solvency throughout the stress scenario. Whether $925 billion, $29 billion, or some intermediate amount of additional equity is the "right" amount of capital to ensure financial stability is anyone's guess-but in the end, despite all the modeling and calculations, it remains a guess.
It is possible, perhaps even likely, that alternative modelling approaches can reduce the difference between the capital shortfall estimates produced by the competing modelling approaches. However, it is unclear how much convergence can be achieved by altering stress test modeling techniques alone. If banks differ in some important dimension(s), it seems unlikely that the stress test forecast from a representative bank model will closely align with forecasts from individual bank-specific stress test models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the mandatory stress test requirement imposed by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the Federal Reserve Board stress testing regime adopted to comply with the requirement. Section III reviews the New York Federal Reserve CLASS approach for stress test modeling. Section IV discusses the experimental design and the data used in the analysis. Section V reviews the estimation results for the representative bank model and individual bank stress test models.
Section VI focuses on the alternative stress test forecasts of the ratio of bank income before tax and extraordinary items to assets. Section VII discusses the stress test forecasts of bank equity to asset ratios, the measure of capital adequacy I use in the analysis. Section VIII provides a perspective on the policy implications of the analysis and Section IX concludes the paper. "are intended to provide company management and boards of directors, the public, and supervisors with forward-looking information to help gauge the potential effect of stressful conditions on the ability of these large banking organizations to absorb losses, while meeting obligations to creditors and other counterparties, and continuing to serve as credit intermediaries."
II. Mandatory regulatory stress tests
In order to fulfill this role, individual institutions need to estimate their stress test models using data on their own historical performance. If an institution has adequate historical data on its own performance, data on the performance of other institutions, including data on a "representative 7 The Federal Reserve Board has recently reduced the scenarios to two: a baseline and a severely adverse scenario (John Heltman, American Banker, January 8, 2019 bank", or data on the average performance of the banking system writ large is of secondary importance when calibrating a bank's own internal models to be used to project the bank's performance in Dodd-Frank stress scenarios.
The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) does not make extensive public disclosures regarding the details of its own Dodd-Frank stress test model methodology. However, the FRB does disclose that its stress test model uses an "industry average" approach using pooled institution data, and are not bank specific, "The estimated model parameters are the same for all BHCs and reflect industrywide, portfolio-specific, and instrument-specific response to variation in the macroeconomic and financial market variables. This industrywide approach reflects both the challenge in estimating separate, statistically robust models for each of the 33 BHCs and the desire of the Federal Reserve not to assume that historical BHC-specific results will prevail in the future." (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, 2016, p. 3.) The difference in focus between the models used by individual institutions and the models used by bank regulatory agencies-firm-specific versus industry average models-raises questions regarding the comparability of forecasts produced by these alternative stress test modeling approaches. Can an industry average representative bank model be used to accurately evaluate the forecasts from bank-specific stress test models? How do the stress scenario forecasts from industry average stress test models compare to forecasts generated by individual bank stress test models when these forecasts are prepared for identical stressful economic scenarios? These issues are fundamentally important and yet they have received relatively little attention in the existing literature. To circumvent unit root issues, the CLASS models estimate bank income components in ratio, normalizing quarterly bank income and expense items by bank assets or other balance sheet values (e.g. total loans) that share a common time trend. When estimated in ratio form, 9 The Federal Reserve Board has announced plans to provide some additional details and disclosures regarding is Dodd-Frank stress test model, but its new disclosures will be limited so as not to allow banks to replicate the Feds modeling approach. According to a recent American Banker story, in his public comments, Vice Chairman Quarles has remarked that, "With respect to the models, he said, the US has developed a system whereby the Fed's own proprietary model is the binding constraint, meaning that there is a risk in over-divulging its secrets." (John Heltman, American Banker, Feb 7, 2019) .
bank income components can be successfully modeled as stationary time series. To convert ratio forecasts back into income component projections, the CLASS model applies historical average balance sheet growth rates to forecast asset levels in out-of-sample stress scenario simulations.
The CLASS model forecasts a bank's net non-provision income-to-asset ratio. Table 1 along with summary statistics for these data.
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I estimate a CLASS-style model using historical data for a representative bank. The representative banks data is constructed as the asset-weighted average of all insured depository institutions. The explanatory variables that measure bank-specific balance sheet and operational characteristics that are included in the first step of CLASS-style model are reported in Table 2 along with summary statistics for the data of the representative bank.
I estimate individual stress test models and compute stress scenario forecasts for all traditional banks with total assets in excess of $100 billion as of June 2008, provided the banks remained independent through June 2011. Figure 1 plots representative bank data for the ratio of income before tax and extraordinary items to assets (INBFTXEX), and its five component ratios: net interest income to assets (NIM), noninterest income to assets (NONII), noninterest expense to assets (NONIX), 14 FIA Card Services has characteristics that differ markedly from the other banks in the analysis. Because it is a credit card bank it does make any loans in some of the loan categories included in the first stage of the CLASS model. As a consequence, the first step CLASS model design matrix is singular. FIA must be modeled with a different algorithm than is used to fit the other banks' CLASS models. I omitted FIA Card Services to maintain the consistency of the estimation process across all estimated stress test models.
loan and lease loss provision expense to assets (ELNATR) and securities gains (losses) to assets (IGLSEC). The relationship between INBFTXEX and its the five earnings/expense component ratios is,
When a bank constructs is own stress test models, it is natural that it would model its own historical performance data. The bank's own profit and loss history are most closely tied to the loan underwriting, capitalization, funding, and other risk management policies practiced by bank management and only indirectly related to the average performance characteristics of the entire industry.
When building individual bank stress test models it is important to recognize that most of the largest U.S. banks attained their size in part by acquiring other bank assets through mergers. 17 Under pooling-of-interests accounting treatment, the target bank's assets, liabilities, and owner's equities are combined with those of the acquiring bank at book value. Under purchase accounting treatment, the assets of the target bank are marked to market before they are combined with the acquiring bank's assets. Any difference between the purchase price and the implied mark-to-market value of target bank's equity is recorded as goodwill in the acquiring bank's balance sheet. My method for merger adjusting the data implicitly assumes that all mergers used pooling-of-interests accounting. All CLASS-style models are estimated using backward stepwise regression. The algorithm starts with all potential explanatory variables in the model and, at each step identifies the variable whose estimated coefficient has the highest probability of being consistent with the null hypothesis that the coefficient has a 0 value (the coefficient estimate with the largest t-test pvalue). The variable is eliminated, the model is re-estimated, and the variable with highest pvalue is again identified and eliminated. The constant term is retained in the regression regardless of its statistical significance. The algorithm continues until the process maximizes the regression's adjusted R-square statistic. If bank stress test performance is projected using a bank-specific model, the mergeradjustment process for the stress test forecast is more complex. Using Figure 3 as the example, the additional steps involve constructing merger-adjusted data for each of the four merger- 19 In the case of Figure 3 , this requires calculating initial conditions for four merger-augmented banks: banks A and E; banks A, E and F; banks A, E, F and G; banks A, E, F, G, and H.
augmented banks for the period 1993 Q2 through 2008 Q2. These merger-adjusted data are used to estimate bank-specific stress test models for each of the stress period merger-augmented banks. The stress test model coefficient estimates for the merger-augmented banks along with appropriate initial conditions (calculated as in Figure 3 ) are used to generate 12-quarter stress test forecasts for each merger-augmented bank. The merger-adjusted stress test forecast is assembled from the stress period forecasts of these merger-augmented banks following the same process outlined in Figure 3 . Again, depending on the merger history in the stress test period, merger adjusting a bank's stress test forecast could require estimating up to twelve merger-augmented stress test models, 12 sets of merger-augmented initial conditions, and extracting appropriate quarterly forecasts from up to a dozen 12-quarter stress scenario forecasts.
VII. Stress test forecasts of bank capital adequacy
Under a few simple assumptions, the stress scenario quarterly forecasts of INBFTXEX can be used to estimate the impact of bank profits and losses on a bank's capital position.
Assuming that, over the stress scenario, the bank forgoes making any capital distributions (dividends or share buybacks), does not raise any new external capital or undertake any assets sales, and reinvests any profits and absorbs any losses by scaling up or down its existing equity, investments and operations, it can be shown 20 that the banks equity-to-asset ratio will evolve according to the following equation,
Using a bank's reported June 2008 equity-to-asset ratio and the actual and forecasted quarterly values of INBFTXEX over the stress scenario, equation (2) can be used to project the evolution of the bank's ratio of equity-to-assets over the course of the stress test scenario. Since this approach begins with a bank's capital position as of June 2008 and then adjusts the capital ratio dynamically using only additions and subtractions generated by the bank's quarterly INBFTXEX, these estimates are free from any distortion introduced by capital injections from governemnt assistance programs like TARP.
21 The top panel of Table 10 lists the actual equity-asset ratios for each bank calculated using Call report data for each of the 12 stress test quarters. The bottom panel of Table 10 reports the quarterly values of each institution's equity-to-asset ratio calculated using each banks reported INBFTXEX ratio, the passive operating assumption, equation (2) and each institution's actual reported equity-to-asset ratio in June 2008 as an initial condition.
A comparison of the top and bottom panels of Table 10 suggests a number of interesting features of each bank's capitalization history. In the case of Bank of America, Citibank, Sun
Trust, Region's Bank, BB&T, PNC, HSBC and RBS, it is likely that at least some TARP capital inejected at the bank holding company level was passed down to bolster the bank's capital adequacy position. Each of these banks' reported quarterly INBFTXEX values that were insufficient to generate the the equity-to-asset ratios reported on their Call reports.
A comparison of the top and bottom panels of Table 10 justifies the use of a passive operating assumption and equation (2) to estimate the equity-to-asset ratios these banks would have reported in the absence of capital infusions or payouts over the first 12 quarters of the financial crisis. The estimates in lower panel of Table 10 are reasonable baseline estimates of the capital ratios each bank would have posted had each retained all its earnings, absorbed losses, and avoided share repurchases, asset sales, and external capital injections over the first 12 quarters of the financial crisis.
I arbitrarily set 6 percent as the minimum equity capital ratio that a bank must maintain to "pass" the stress test. Since I provide data on all institutions capital positions, an interested reader can easily see the implications of selecting a different minimum capital threshold. Using the 6-percent minimum equity-asset ratio as the pass/fail criteria, the estimates in the bottom panel of Table 10 suggest that two banks (Bank of New York and HSBC) would have failed the stress test during the first 12 quarters of the financial crisis had they followed the passive operating strategy and avoided raising any new capital. Table 10 do not suggest that these two banks were deeply undercapitalized. The top panel of The bottom panel of Table 11 reports the stress scenario forecasts of each bank's equityasset ratio using equation (2) need tens of billions of dollars in additional equity capital. State Street also fails to maintain the required 6-percent minimum equity-asset ratio, but its estimated equity-capital shortfall, $125 million, is more manageable. In total, the representative bank model estimates that these 14 large banks face a equity capital deficit of $924 billion if they are to remain well-capitalized throughout the stress scenario.
23 Table 12 reports the results of the stress test when bank-specific CLASS-style models are estimated and used to forecast INBFTXEX. The forecasts in the top panel of Table 12 are fully merger-adjusted. Bank-specific CLASS models coefficients are re-estimated to reflect stress 22 The representative bank model coefficients are unaffected by stress period mergers. However, stress period forecasts are impacted by merger-induced changes in initial forecast conditions as previously discussed. 23 The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was created under the authority of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. TARP originally allocated $700 billion that could be used to purchase of assets of or inject capital into targeted financial institutions.
period acquisitions using merger-adjusted quarterly data from June 1993 through June 2008.
June 2008 initial forecast conditions are also adjusted to account for stress period mergers.
The bank-specific CLASS style model forecasts repeated large quarterly losses at Bank of New York. These losses exhaust the bank's capital and, by the end of the stress scenario, it has a large negative equity position. Bank-specific stress test models also forecast modest but repeated losses at JPMorgan Chase, PNC and Capital One, but only in the case of JPMorgan
Chase do the cumulative losses push the bank below the 6-percent minimum equity-to-asset threshold.
When the banks are allowed to use their own data to estimate CLASS-style stress test 
VIII. Discussion
The analysis highlights the policy uncertainty inherent when stress tests are used to set institution-specific required minimum capital levels or to assess the overall capital adequacy of the banking system. Actual bank outcomes suggest that only two banks (Bank of New York and HSBC) would fail to maintain a 6 percent minimum equity-to-asset threshold throughout the stress period but would together require only $151 million in additional equity capital to remain capitalized above the 6 percent threshold. In contrast, the representative bank CLASS-style stress test model forecasts the failure of 6 banks, and all by large margins. In aggregate, forecasts from the representative bank model suggest that these 6 failing banks would require an additional $924 billion in equity capital to pass the stress test. Finally, CLASS-style stress test models estimated using each bank's own historical data predict two stress test failures (Bank of New York and JPMorgan Chase) with an aggregate equity capital shortfall of nearly $29 billion.
Had these stress tests been run in July 2008 using a stress scenario that anticipated the exact financial market and macroeconomic data that materialized over the next three years, regulatory authorities would have faced a policy conundrum: they would have to decide whether they were facing a US banking system that was moderately undercapitalized (a $29 billion capital shortfall), or massively undercapitalized (a $925 billion capital shortfall). At the time of the stress test, no one could have known the actual outcome for these 14 institutions (a shortfall of $151 million).
The uncertainty facing regulatory authorities is compounded by the fact that, in July 2008 when this hypothetical stress test takes place, there is no tool or data analysis authorities can use to determine which stress test estimates are likely to be more realistic. Authorities could compare stress test models using the respective models' fit within the estimation sample, but each model is estimated using a different data set. By design, the modelling approach generates the best-fit for its estimation sample (according to the adjusted-R 2 statistic). Unless the stress test model coefficient estimates for the representative bank model and a bank-specific CLASS-style model exactly agree, the bank-specific model will always provide a better adjusted R 2 fit for a bank's own historical data. The reverse is also always true. A further limiting factor is the small sample size (61 quarterly auto correlated observations) that authorities have to work with. In this setting, there are no statistical tests I am aware of that can accurately determine which stress test forecast is likely to be more reliable.
IX. Conclusion
The findings in this study suggest that when stress tests are used to judge the capital adequacy of the largest US banks, to a large extent, the outcome of the stress test exercise depends on the expert judgement of regulatory authorities. Consider for example a hypothetical stress test exercise conducted in July 2008 with an economic scenario that exactly mimics the first 12 quarters of the great recession financial crisis. Forecasts from a representative bank stress test model suggest that, faced with this scenario, 6 of the 14 largest US banks would become deeply insolvent. In contrast, forecasts from bank-specific stress test models suggest that only 2 of 14 institutions would fail to maintain the required 6 percent equity-asset ratio. The actual data show that only 2 of the 14 institutions actually failed to maintain a 6-percent equity-asset ratio, and for these institutions, only $151 million of additional equity would have permitted them to pass the stress test. 
Appendix
Using the following two dynamic identities,
the bank's ratio of equity to assets has the following dynamics, All models are estimated using quarterly data from June 1993 through June 2008 (61 observations), using backward stepwise regression where variables are eliminated to generate the maximum adjusted R 2 value. T-Statitics appear in parenthesis under coefficient estimates.The representive bank is the asset-weighted average of all insured depository institutions in a quarter. Individual bank estimates use merger-adjusted quarterly data including mergers completed through June 2008. All bank-specific variables are lagged one quarter. All models are estimated using quarterly data from June 1993 through June 2008 (61 observations), using backward stepwise regression where variables are eliminated to generate the maximum adjusted R 2 value. T-statistics are in parenthesis below coefficient estimates. The representive bank is the asset-weighted average of all insured depository institutions in a quarter. Individual bank estimates use merger-adjusted quarterly data including mergers completed through June 2008. All bank-specific variables are lagged one quarter. All models are estimated using quarterly data from June 1993 through June 2008 (61 observations), using backward stepwise regression where variables are eliminated to generate the maximum adjusted R 2 value. T-statistics appear in parenthesis below coefficient estimates. The representive bank is the asset-weighted average of all insured depository institutions in a quarter. Individual bank estimates use merger-adjusted quarterly data including mergers completed through June 2008. All bankspecific variables are lagged one quarter. 
